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I. INTRODUCTION
In June 1995, some 200 years after the birth of the Constitution,
the Supreme Court of the United States held that random, suspi-
cionless drug testing of junior and senior high school athletes was con-
stitutional.1 On the surface, the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton 2 appears to be a reasonable ap-
proach to the onerous problem of drugs in our schools. The Court bal-
anced the promotion of a legitimate governmental interest against the
intrusion on individual freedoms. After balancing these conflicting
concerns, the Court determined the government's interest in protect-
ing the educational process and deterring drug use outweighed the in-
trusion on students' privacy rights.
Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAw REvIEw.
1. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995).
2. Id.
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The reasoning behind the Court's decision to allow random, suspi-
cionless drug testing of junior and senior high school athletes will con-
vince many people. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's decision to
sanction blanket searches of student athletes is shocking. Underlying
the Court's decision are complex legal, social, and policy issues that
are not immediately apparent. Complicating matters is the fact that
modern technology makes available a new level of surveillance and
social control that "fundamentally challenges our conceptions of pri-
vacy, dignity, and due process of law."3
Due to the Supreme Court's green light in Vernonia, many schools
are likely to consider the implementation of drug testing policies for
student athletes. The Millard School District could become one of the
first school districts in Nebraska to adopt such a drug testing policy.4
A Millard School Board member who advocates student testing cited
the Supreme Court's ruling as a factor in his decision to push for a
drug testing policy.5 At least one Iowa high school is also exploring
drug testing of athletes.6
Equally shocking is the number of school administrators who are
willing to support such drug testing policies.7 This Note takes the po-
sition that something is terribly wrong here, not only with the Court's
decision in Vernonia sanctioning suspicionless testing, but also with
the public's strong support of these testing policies. The first part of
this Note reviews the drug testing policy of the Vernonia School Dis-
trict and the Court's holding regarding the constitutionality of such a
policy under the Fourth Amendment.S Then, this Note explores some
of the issues implicated by the Court's holding and how they have
evolved. Finally, this Note examines what appears to be the legacy of
the Court's decision in Vernonia and how the standards articulated in
this case may apply in the context of the Millard School District.
At issue in Vernonia is the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution
which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.9 The Supreme
3. JoHN GILIOM, SURVEILANCE, PRIVACY, AND THE LAw: EmLOYEE DRUG TESTING
AND THE PoLrics OF SociL CONTROL 3 (1994).
4. Donnette Dunbar & Rich Kaipust, Millard School Board Studies Drug Tests for
Athletes, OMHA WoILD HERALD, Sept. 9, 1995, at 1.
5. Id. at 10.
6. Iowa School May Test Athletes for Drugs, OMAA WoRLD HERALD, Oct. 18, 1995,
at 19.
7. See Dunbar & Kaipust, supra note 4; Tests for Steroid Abuse Worth It, OMAHA
WORLD HERALD, Sept. 17, 1995, at 8B; Prep Athletes Should Measure Up, OMAHA
WORLD HERALD, June 29, 1995, at 20. See also GILLIOM, supra note 3, at 3 (at-
tempting to answer why drug testing is spreading so rapidly with such limited
and unsuccessful opposition).
8. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995).
9. The Fourth Amendment states: The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
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Court has held that in regard to administrative searches'O the ulti-
mate test of constitutionality is reasonableness,"1 "[a]t least in a case
such as [Vernonia], where there was no clear practice, either approv-
ing or disapproving the type of search at issue, at the time the consti-
tutional provision was enacted."12 What is reasonable under the
Court's modern (within the last 25 years) test of Fourth Amendment
constitutionality is determined by balancing the intrusion upon an in-
dividual's Fourth Amendment interests against the promotion of a le-
gitimate governmental interest.' 3
II. VERNONIA SCHOOL DISTRICT 47J v. ACTON14
Following the implementation of a drug testing policy in the
Vernonia School District (District) where the Actons' son, James, was
a seventh grader, the Actons brought suit to challenge the constitu-
tionality of the drug testing policy under the Fourth Amendment.
James Acton had signed up to play football at one of the District's
grade schools. He was denied participation because he and his par-
ents refused to sign the drug testing consent forms required for partic-
ipation in the District's athletic programs. The Actons claimed that
suspicionless drug testing of all junior and senior high athletes vio-
lated their son's constitutional rights.
The District operates a high school and three grade schools in
Vernonia, Oregon, a small community where school sports play a
prominent role in the town's life. In the mid-to-late 80's, teachers and
administrators indicated that they had observed a sharp increase in
disciplinary problems which they attributed to student use of drugs
ported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
10. "Iistorically, administrative searches were those searches whose main purpose
related to legitimate health, safety, and police power regulatory interests, not law
enforcement interests. In theory, whenever the main purpose of a search is to
investigate a particular crime thought to be committed by a particular individual,
then an administrative search rationale will not support the search. In practice,
particularly in the past ten years, the line separating health/safety/regulatory
and criminal investigations has blurred." Josephine R. Potuto, A Practitioner's
Primer to the Fourth Amendment, 70 NEB. L. REV. 412, 431 (1991).
11. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2390 (1995).
12. Id.
13. Id. (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989)).
See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)(introducing balancing as a test of rea-
sonableness for civil and criminal cases); Camera v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523
(1967). The use of balancing as a test of reasonableness, although only a modem
development in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, is now well entrenched in the
Fourth Amendment as a result of United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543
(1976), and Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
14. 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995).
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and alcohol.15 Subsequently, the school board concluded that it had a
general drug problem among the student body, particularly among
student athletes.16 When drug education and other remedial efforts
did not end the disciplinary problems, District officials, with input
from parents, adopted a drug testing policy. The policy was directed
toward student athletes for two reasons.1 7 First, in the view of school
administrators, student athletes were leaders of the drug culture; and,
second, there was a fear that the drug abuse would cause athletic
injuries.
A. The Policy
The drug testing policy applied to all junior and senior high stu-
dents participating in interscholastic athletics.18 The student ath-
letes and their parents were required to sign a form consenting to the
testing. All athletes were tested at the beginning of their season.
Then, once each week of the season, the names of all the athletes were
placed in a pool from which a student, with the supervision of two
adults, blindly selected 10 percent of the athletes for random testing.
15. "We are not inclined to question-indeed, we could not possibly find clearly erro-
neous-the District Court's conclusion that 'a large segment of the student body,
particularly those involved in interscholastic athletics, was in a state of rebellion,'
... and that 'the rebellion was being fueled by alcohol and drug abuse... .'"
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2395 (1995). The brief for the
Actons however, reports that there was little evidence of students using drugs,
that the evidence consisted almost entirely of complaints by a few teachers and
administrators, and that students generally seemed to be less well-mannered
than anyone remembered. Respondents' Brief at 2, Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton,
115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995)(No. 94-590). These assumptions were supported, at least
in the teachers' minds, by unconfirmed, second-hand reports of off-campus drug
use that were received over hearsay objections. Id. at 3. Only one of the teachers
who testified at trial reported that she ever actually observed any student taking
drugs. Id. at 4.
16. The evidence pointing to athletes in particular was: testimony by the wrestling
coach that a student was injured when he failed to react quickly to a hold an
opponent put on him and a day later the coach went to the hotel room where four
wrestlers, including the injured wrestler, were staying and smelled what he be-
lieved to be marijuana; this same coach testified that in 1985 the coach he was an
assistant for was called by parents and told that some students had done drugs
on a road trip; the football coach testified that he watched some football game
films and noticed that some of the students did not react to situations the way he
taught them so he wondered if they were under the influence of drugs, Respon-
dents' Brief at 7 n.8, Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995)(No. 94-
590); it was reported by the principal at trial that four football players had told
the football coach that they had used amphetamines. Id. at 4 n.1.
17. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2389 (1995).
18. The District offered football, basketball, track, cross country, and volleyball start-
ing in the seventh grade and wrestling and golf starting in the ninth grade. "Be-
tween 60 to 65 percent of high school students and approximately 75 percent of
elementary students participate in interscholastic athletics." Petitioner's Brief 3,
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995)(No. 94-590).
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Those athletes chosen were retrieved and tested, that same day if
possible.
The testing procedures consisted of the student completing a speci-
men control form and identifying any prescription medications that
the student was taking. The student then entered an empty locker
room accompanied by an adult monitor of the same sex. The boys se-
lected produced urine samples at a urinal fully clothed. The monitor
stood 12 to 15 feet behind the student.' 9 Monitors were given author-
ity to watch the student while he produced the sample.20 Girls pro-
duced samples in a bathroom stall while the monitor listened through
the stall for "normal sounds of urination."2 1 After the sample was pro-
duced, it was given to the monitor who checked it for temperature and
tampering and then transferred it to a vial. A laboratory later tested
the sample for amphetamines, cocaine, and marijuana.2 2 The super-
intendent, principals, vice principals, and athletic directors were
granted access to the test results.
B. The Proceedings Below
The Supreme Court in a 6 to 3 decision23 reversed the Ninth Cir-
cuit's unanimous holding that the drug testing program violated
James Acton's right to be free from an unreasonable search under the
Oregon Constitution.24 The court of appeals had concluded that the
intrusiveness of the search relative to the importance of the policy in-
terest was dispositive.25 However, unlike the Supreme Court, the
19. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton 113 S. Ct. 2386, 2389 (1995).
20. Respondents' brief states that at least one male monitor testified that he some-
times watches the boys produce the sample. Respondents' Brief at 9, Vernonia
Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995)(No. 94-590).
21. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2389 (1995).
22. Even though the administration had concluded that the rebellion was being fu-
eled by drug and alcohol use, the tests apparently did not test for the presence of
alcohol. Id.
23. Id. at 2397 (O'Connor, Stevens, and Souter, J., dissenting).
24. Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 23 F.3d 1514 (9th Cir. 1994). The court of ap-
peals noted that it was constrained to decide the case on state constitutional
grounds to avoid deciding an unnecessary constitutional issue. Id. at 1518. Art.
I, § 9, of the Oregon Constitution prohibits "unreasonable" government searches.
Id.
Since a state constitution can grant broader protection than the federal consti-
tution, the Actons had argued in their brief opposing a writ of certiorari that the
Supreme Court should deny the writ because the decision below rested on state
law. Respondents' Brief at 15 n.11, Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct.
2386 (1995)(No. 94-590). In the alternative, the Actons argued that if the
Supreme Court found that the District's drug testing policy did not violate the
Fourth Amendment, the case should be remanded to the court of appeals to deter-
mine, once again, whether the program would violate broader protections under
the state constitution. Id. at 15.
25. Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 23 F.3d 1514 (9th Cir. 1994).
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court of appeals held that the privacy interests of athletes were not
substantially lower than those of students in general.2 6 In addition,
while the Ninth Circuit found that the importance of the policy inter-
ests-preventing unnecessary athletic injuries, reducing the attrac-
tiveness of drugs among other students, and improving discipline-
were not "minimal," those interests suffered in comparison to the
kinds of dangers that exist when random drug testing has been
approved. 27
The Supreme Court did not agree with the court of appeal's assess-
ment of the privacy interests at stake. In addition, the Court found
that the court of appeals had erroneously decided the case under the
federal constitution.28 For these reasons, the Supreme Court vacated
the Ninth Circuit's judgement and remanded the case for further pro-
ceedings consistant with its opinion.
C. Rights in the Balance
The factors the Supreme Court evaluated in weighing the students'
Fourth Amendment interests included the students' expectations of
privacy and the character of the intrusion itself. The Court concluded
that Fourth Amendment rights are different in public schools than
elsewhere. The Court stated that, generally, "the nature of those
rights is what is appropriate for children in school."29 For their own
good, and that of their classmates, public schools have routinely re-
quired students to submit to various physical examinations and to be
vaccinated against various diseases. Accordingly, the Court reasoned
that the result of those required examinations was that students
within the school environment have a lesser expectation of privacy
than members of the population at large.SO
In regards to the rights of athletes specifically, the Court's opinion
indicated that "[s]chool sports are not for the bashful."31 There is "an
26. Id. at 1525.
27. Id. at 1526.
28. The Supreme Court stated that the Ninth Circuit's holding, that the drug policy
violated the Oregon Constitution, was largely based on the Fourth Amendment
and, therefore, the holding was in error since it rested on a flawed premise.
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2397 (1995). They vacated the
judgment and remanded the case to the court of appeals. Id. On remand, the
court of appeals affirmed the decision of the district court, finding the drug test-
ing policy constitutional on the basis of the Supreme Court's ruling. Vernonia
Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 66 F.3d 217 (1995).
29. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2392 (1995).
30. Id. at 2392. But cf. Scott E. Sundby, Everyman's Fourth Amendment: Privacy or
Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. Rav. 1751, 1798
(arguing that there is a difference in kind between the privacy interests at stake
when one voluntarily submits to a medical examination as opposed to the govern-
ment requiring submission).
31. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2392 (1995).
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element of 'communal undress' inherent in athletic participation."
3 2
The Court found that school athletes have a reduced expectation of
privacy because they voluntarily subject themselves to a degree of reg-
ulation higher than that imposed on other students, including
preseason physical exams, adequate insurance coverage or waiver,
minimum grade point averages, and any other rules that coaches may
establish for each sport. According to the Court, students who volun-
tarily participate in school athletics have reason to expect intrusions
upon normal rights and privileges, including privacy.
Likewise, while evaluating the character of the intrusion in a drug
testing program, the Court recognized that the test intrudes upon an
excretory function traditionally shielded by great privacy. Nonethe-
less, the Court reasoned that since the testing conditions were nearly
identical to those typically encountered in a public restroom, the com-
promise of privacy interests was negligible. 33 The fact that students
are required to identify in advance prescription medications was not
found to significantly affect the privacy interest of the students. "[Wle
have never indicated that requiring advance disclosure of medications
is per se unreasonable. Indeed, in Skinner we held that it was not 'a
significant invasion of privacy.'" 34 The Court reasoned that since the
policy was not specific with regard to the procedures for furnishing
prescription information, it was unwilling to assume that the informa-
tion could not be handled in a confidential manner, thereby reducing
the significance of the privacy interest.3 5
These minimal privacy intrusions were then balanced against the
governmental interests that had prompted the testing policy. Those
governmental interests were: the nature of the concern, the immedi-
acy of the concern, and the efficacy of the policy for addressing that
concern. According to the Court, the nature of the governmental con-
cern was: the importance of the government's need to deter drug use
among school children, the need to ensure that the educational pro-
cess is not disrupted by drugs, and the special responsibility under-
taken by the government through its schools to provide care and
direction to school children, especially to athletes where the risk of
injury is particularly high. The Court concluded that the immediacy
and efficacy of the policy were self-evident and cited the district court's
findings that the student body was in a state of rebellion and that a
32. Id. at 2393 (quoting Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1318
(7th Cir. 1988)).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 2394 (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 626
n.7 (1989)).
35. "It may well be that, if and when James was selected for random testing at a time
that he was taking medication, the School District would have permitted him to
provide the requested information in a confidential manner - for example, in a
sealed envelope delivered to the testing lab." Id.
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drug problem fueled by athletes is effectively addressed by making
sure that they do not use drugs.3 6 After balancing the student ath-
lete's decreased expectations of privacy and the unobtrusiveness of the
search against the severity of the need, the Court concluded that ran-
dom, suspicionless drug testing of student athletes was reasonable
and, hence, constitutional.
III. ANALYSIS
The Court needed to make a deeper analysis of the effect of
Vernonia on privacy rights. The Court's decision fails to address the
legitimacy of its balancing analysis in relation to two separate out-
comes. First, what happens if random, suspicionless drug testing of
youth is sanctioned by the Court as constitutional? Second, what hap-
pens if the Court rejects suspicionless drug testing as unconstitu-
tional? When the Court sidestepped these issues as policy questions
better left to school administrators, it completely disregarded funda-
mental questions of liberty. Much criticism has already been written
of the Court's use of the balancing test in Fourth Amendment deci-
sions, specifically, the easy manipulability of the test and the dis-
counting of significant privacy interests.3 7 The purpose of this Note is
not to revisit those criticisms. Instead of criticizing the weights as-
signed to those factors the Court did address, this Note attempts to
identify issues that are conspicuously missing from the Court's
analysis.
The Court's decision also fails to adequately discuss the uncertain
legacy Vernonia leaves behind. The Court's decision to reaffirm the
use of random, suspicionless testing signifies a profound social change
that alters the fundamental power of citizens to avoid arbitrary gov-
ernment control. Consequently, there is an air of unreality behind the
Court's analysis of the factors at stake under the Fourth Amend-
ment.38 Upon reviewing the Court's reasoning, one is left to wonder
whether the members of the Court were ever teenagers3 9 or whether
they have ever used a public restroom. The Court's reliance on vari-
36. Id. at 2395-96.
37. E.g., Donald Crowley & Jeffrey L. Johnson, Balancing and the Legitimate Expec-
tation of Privacy, 7 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REV. 337 (1988).
Perhaps some of the sharpest criticism of the Court's use of a balancing test
under the Fourth Amendment has come from the Court's own members. See
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 567 (1976)(Brennan & Marshall,
JJ., dissenting); Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 456-57
(1990)(Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
38. See Sundby, supra note 30, at 1790 (asserting that the Court's findings of expec-
tations of privacy are so limited as to seem unreal).
39. See Martin R. Gardner, Student Privacy in the Wake of T.L.O.: An Appeal for an
Individualized Suspicion Requirement for Valid Searches and Seizures in the
Schools, 22 GA. L. REv. 897, 902-04 (1988)(noting that adolescents tend to be
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ous assumptions seems greatly misplaced in light of the experiences of
ordinary individuals. As a result, the Court appears to be greatly out
of touch with the human condition.
Finally, the Court fails to responsibly conduct judicial review. This
failure is largely the result of the Court's adherence to form over sub-
stance. A review of the Court's failure in Vernonia and the legacy its
decision leaves behind suggests that something is terribly wrong here.
A. The Failure of Judicial Review
The Constitution and public policy do not speak to the same inter-
ests.40 The Court's role is to uphold the Constitution when it conflicts
with policy. 4 1 Since the Supreme Court's decision in Marbury v.
Madison,42 shortly after the adoption of the Constitution, the
Supreme Court of the United States has been the last word on what is
constitutional. As a result, the Court is perceived by many to be the
champion of our most cherished liberties. As John Marshall once
stated, "To what quarter will you look for protection from an infringe-
ment on the Constitution, if you will not give the power to the
judiciary?'"43
The Supreme Court is a powerful institution. Its role as guardian
of the Constitution has always been a great source of comfort for many
Americans. However, the Court's recent treatment of Fourth Amend-
ment freedoms has become the subject of much legal commentary.44
While the Court's failure to protect important liberty interests in
Vernonia is not without precedent,45 it has perhaps never been more
pronounced or profound.46 The sheer volume of legal commentary
more self-conscious than adults and that privacy rights insulate young people
from substantial psychological harm)(emphasis added).
40. Professor Josephine Potuto, Address to a constitutional law class, University of
Nebraska College of Law (Oct. 3, 1995).
41. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
42. Id.
43. THE COAMpSSION ON THE BicENrErN-IAL OF THE UNMTED STATES CONsTrrUTION 47
(15th ed. 1991).
44. See Robert B. Harper, School Searches-A Look into the 21st Century, 13 Miss. C.
L. REV. 293 (1993); Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment, 35 W i. & MARY L. REv. 197 (1993); Myron Schreck, The Fourth Amend-
ment in the Public Schools: Issues for the 1990s and Beyond, 25 URn. LAw 117
(1993); William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth
Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REv. 553, (1992); Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth
Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camera and Terry, 72 M-NN. L. REv.
383 (1988); Christian J. Rowley, Note, Florida v. Bostick: The Fourth Amend-
ment-Another Casualty of the War on Drugs, 1992 UTAH L. REv. 601.
45. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943);
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
46. Bruce G. Berner, The Supreme Court and the Fall of the Fourth Amendment, 25
VA. U. L. lEv. 383 (1991); Daniel J. Capra, Prisoners of Their Own Jurispru-
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criticizing the Court's jurisprudence on Fourth Amendment protec-
tions may be unprecedented. 47
Arguments about rights have been relatively unsuccessful with the
Court recently in regards to administrative searches, and there is
good reason to wonder how surveillance without suspicion has so eas-
ily become an apparatus of administrative power.48 In Vernonia, the
Court sanctioned an approach to law and order in society that views
pervasive surveillance and control as a necessary part of modern gov-
ernment.49 Far from being the protector of constitutional liberties,
the precedent the Supreme Court laid down in Vernonia and other
recent Fourth Amendment cases5O virtually ensures the legitimacy of
intrusive surveillance programs as legitimate mechanisms of social
control.51
The Court tried to limit the holding in Vernonia as a necessary
result of the public school environment and the more limited constitu-
tional rights of minors.52 These distinctions are largely unpersuasive
for several reasons. First, the holding in Vernonia is closely tied to the
Court's decisions in other Fourth Amendment cases that upheld the
constitutionality of suspicionless testing in other contexts. 53 Thus,
the decision in Vernonia was actually an extension of those holdings.
The fate of the student athletes in Vernonia is closely intertwined
with other recent Fourth Amendment holdings by the Court and is
really part of a much larger issue. The Court has justified intrusions
dence: Fourth and Fifth Amendment Cases in the Supreme Court, 36 VLL. L.
REv. 1267 (1991); Bradley W. Foster, Warrantless Aerial Surveillance and the
Right to Privacy: The Flight of the Fourth Amendment, 56 J. AIR L. & CoM. 719
(1991); James F. Heuerman, Note, Florida v. Bostick: Abandonment of Reason in
Fourth Amendment Reasonable Person Analysis, 13 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 173 (1992);
Daniel J. Polatsek, Note, Thermal Imaging and the Fourth Amendment: Pushing
the Katz Test Towards Terminal Velocity, 13 J. MARsHAiLL J. COnPUTER I h*o. L.
453 (1995).
47. See Sundby, supra note 30, at 1752 ("The Supreme Court's recent Fourth Amend-
ment decisions have drawn increasingly sharp criticism from the legal academy.
Article after article documents the Court's transgressions: how it has riddled the
Warrant Clause with exceptions, has suffocated individual privacy through an
all-encompassing reasonableness standard, and has extended unprecedented
powers to law enforcement agencies. If ever a united cry of warning has been
made that a basic civil liberty was in danger, this chorus of law review laments is
it.").
48. GILLioM, supra note 3, at 4.
49. GILLIOM, supra note 3, at 2 (asserting that this is the ultimate result of the
Court's holdings in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602
(1989), and National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656
(1989)).
50. See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
51. GmLIOM, supra note 3, at 4.
52. Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2391-92 (1995).
53. See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
[Vol. 75:151
1996] DRUG TESTING WEAKENS THE 4TH AMENDMENT 161
on basic freedoms because of "special needs."54 Therefore, any discus-
sion of the Court's holding in Vernonia necessarily requires for context
the other Fourth Amendment decisions by the Court which provide
the foundation for the Vernonia holding. Those who discount the deci-
sion in Vernonia by stating that children are different fail to under-
stand the pervasiveness of the erosion of individual privacy rights, as
they relate to suspicionless testing.
1. Form Over Substance
The issues in most constitutional cases evoke the usual discussion
into the intent and original meaning behind the constitutional right at
stake. Attempts to reconstruct the purpose underlying the right in-
volve various authoritative methods of interpretation.55 The problem
is that advocates can almost always find support for any position
taken,56 so ultimately, courts grow weary of attempts to construct the
purpose behind the elements of the Constitution and instead will rely
on what has gone before.57 What has gone before is the essence of
legal formalism, the rule of stare decisis. The use of precedent serves
an important role by ensuring consistency and trust in the application
of the law. However, sometimes the result is that the real rights at
issue are sacrificed for the sake of form.s5 As a result, by the time the
Court reached its holding in Vernonia, it had moved far away from the
substance of Fourth Amendment protection.59 The important rights
at stake are treated like second-class citizens.
2. The Substance: Rights as Power
What is at stake in the Court's decision in Vernonia is the equilib-
rium established by our constitutional system. 60 The essence of our
system of government is the balancing of power 6' between the various
54. The Court has described these special needs as those needs beyond the reach of
normal law enforcement. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) ("the
substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in
the schools").
55. Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 Hanv. L. Ray. 820,
821-24 (1994).
56. Id.
57. See Capra, supra note 46, at 1267-68.
58. Id. See Sundby, supra note 30, at 1788 (noting the Court's substitution of words
for analysis).
59. See Capra, supra note 46, at 1268 (arguing that the Court uses whatever prece-
dent is at hand without concern for future doctrinal development).
60. The concept of equilibrium as established by the Constitution came from a phrase
in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, in which Justice Jackson described
how the Constitution diffuses power to better secure liberty. 343 U.S. 579, 635
(1952)(Jackson, J., concurring).
61. See, e.g., id. Even the language of the Declaration of Independence signals the
significance of power. "[A]nd to assume among the powers of the earth, the sepa-
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branches of government and between citizens and the government.
The Founders of this nation understood that with power comes the
ability to control.62 The extent of power that should be granted to
each segment of this nation's government preoccupied the constitu-
tional discussions.63 Nearly every early judicial decision following the
adoption of the Constitution that attempted to interpret the meaning
and purpose of constitutional provisions mentioned the distribution of
power, and the checks on that power, as the root of the provision in
question.64 It was the tyranny that the Colonists had suffered at the
hands of the British that shaped their vision of democracy and ulti-
mately led to the Declaration of Independence and later to the Consti-
tution.65 When the judiciary and the public sanction the kind of
surveillance and social control signaled in the Vernonia case, they al-
ter the balance of power established by the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights. The balance in question lies between individual citizens and
their government.
Under the Court's current construction of constitutional protec-
tions, children are the ultimate example of a subordinate class capable
of being dominated by a more powerful group. It was abuses of power
over this group that originally lead the Court to hold that children do
indeed have constitutional rights.66 However, while the Court has
continued to uphold the application of constitutional rights to chil-
dren,67 the holding in Vernonia signals that those rights are still with-
out any real substance. The Court attempted to justify this lack of
substance by noting that at the time of the framing of the Constitu-
tion, children had substantially fewer rights than they do today.6S Of
course, this reasoning fails when you consider that women and blacks
also enjoyed fewer rights at that time, but the Court now recognizes
the dubiousness of that earlier treatment and the need to include
those groups within the full protection of the Constitution.
Children, especially in a public school setting, have become easy
targets for all kinds of groups.69 In many cases, children are already
rate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle
them...." THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
62. See, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
63. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST Nos. 65, 80 (Alexander Hamilton).
64. See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816); Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
65. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
66. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
67. See also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985)(holding that constitutional
rights do apply to children in the public school setting).
68. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2391, 2396 n.4 (1995).
69. See also Tom Shatel, This Testing Fails for Kids, OMAHA WoRLD HERALD, June
28, 1995, at 27 (focus on children is a focus on easy target).
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the victims of ineffective parenting and ineffective teaching.70 With
Vernonia, their lack of power has cost them their dignity and auton-
omy as they become this country's latest scapegoats in the war on
drugs. 71
As Vernonia demonstrates, pressing social issues have led to in-
creased social control via the erosion of Fourth Amendment civil liber-
ties and have left us to wonder what is a reasonable use of power. As
Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote, "[h]istory teaches that grave
threats to liberty often come in times of urgency, when constitutional
rights seem too extravagant to endure.... [W]hen we allow funda-
mental freedoms to be sacrificed in the name of real or perceived exi-
gency, we invariably come to regret it."72
Moved by whatever momentary evil has aroused their fears, officials-per-
haps even supported by a majority of citizens73 -may be tempted to conduct
searches that sacrifice the liberty of each citizen to assuage the perceived evil.
But the Fourth Amendment rests on the principle that a true balance between
the individual and society depends on the recognition of "the right to be let
alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civi-
lized men."74
Ultimately, any characterization of rights for different groups or
classes of individuals, whether it be public employees, private employ-
ees, railroad workers, or public school children, must be congruent
with the equilibrium of power that the Constitution established. In-
stead, the Court has justified the recharacterization of rights under
70. In a 1991 survey, 89% of teachers after their first year of teaching agreed or
strongly agreed with the statement that many children come to school with so
many problems that it is difficult for them to be good students. Patricia L. Van
Dorn, Proposal for a "Lawful" Public School Curriculum: Preventive Law from a
Societal Perspective, 28 IND. L. Rlv. 477, 479 (1995).
71. A scapegoat is: 1. A live goat over whose head Aaron confessed all the sins of the
children of Israel and which was sent into the wilderness symbolically bearing
their sin on the Day of Atonement. Leviticus 16. 2. A person or group bearing
blame for others. TH AME=CAN HEmTAGr.E DIcTIoNARY OF 'HE ENGLISH LAN-
GUAGE 1159 (New College ed. 1979). See also National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 681 (1989)(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I decline to
join the Court's opinion in the present case because neither frequency of use nor
connection to harm is demonstrated or even likely. In my view the Customs Ser-
vice rules are a kind of immolation of privacy and human dignity in symbolic
opposition to drug use.").
72. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989)(Marshall,
J., dissenting).
73. According to a recent survey, over one-half of workers questioned supported drug
testing. GmLIoAf, supra note 3, at 12. "[H]ow do we best explain this support?...
Americans who followed ... news ... were repeatedly told that the nation was
crumbling under the impact of illegal drug use. While only partly true, this im-
agery of crisis worked to create a social context that was widely receptive to drug
testing .... "Id.
74. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,361-62 (1985)(Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part)(citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
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the Fourth Amendment on the basis of special needs, largely the re-
sult of growing social problems.
3. The Rise of Social Problems and Special Needs
The Fourth Amendment applies in both civil and criminal con-
texts. 75 However, the Supreme Court's development of special needs
exceptions under the Fourth Amendment has actually reduced the
protection for the innocent from assertions of search power in civil
contexts. Now, the innocent actually have less protection in certain
civil contexts than that which is provided in the criminal context. 76
The Court has justified this imbalance on the basis of special needs
beyond the need for normal law enforcement. Prior to the develop-
ment of special needs exceptions, the Court's test of a reasonable
search required probable cause. 77 Then, with the advent of adminis-
trative searches, the Court held that those searches related to health,
safety, and police power regulatory interests could be justified as rea-
sonable on grounds other than probable cause, as long as the intrusion
was minimal.78 However, some standard of suspicion, even in admin-
istrative searches, was still required. 79
Then, in United States v. Martinez.Fuerte,8O the Court held that
brief interrogative stops of all motorists crossing certain border check-
points were constitutional even though there was no particular reason
to believe that particular motorists were involved in any wrongdoing.
In arriving at its decision, the Court weighed the public interest in
stopping the flow of illegal aliens against the Fourth Amendment in-
terests of the individual. The Court distinguished these "checkpoint"
stops from roving-patrol stops.8 1 Roving-patrol stops would continue
75. Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967)("The basic purpose of this
Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this Court, is to safeguard
the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmen-
tal officials.").
76. In fact, some members of the Court see this as reasonable. "For me, it would be
unreasonable and at odds with history to argue that the full panoply of constitu-
tional rules applies with the same force and effect in the schoolhouse as it does in
the enforcement of criminal laws." New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 350 (Pow-
ell & O'Connor, JJ., concurring).
77. For a detailed sketching of the evolution of the probable cause requirement, see
Potuto, supra note 10. Potuto states that probable cause "means that the known
facts and circumstances are such that a person of'reasonable caution' would feel
a fair degree of confidence that he knows what is going on and can take action in
response." Id. at 416.
78. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
79. Id. at 560. "Reasonable suspicion requires a quantum of objective data, less than
that necessary to show probable cause, that is reflected in specific, articulable
reasons advanced by a law enforcement officer to explain his suspicion." Potuto,
supra note 10, at 416.
80. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
81. Id. at 558-59.
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to require specific, articulable facts that warranted suspicion.82 How-
ever, the Court reasoned that while the need to make routine check-
point stops was great, the consequent intrusion on Fourth
Amendment interests was minimal, and a requirement of reasonable
suspicion for the stops on major routes inland would be impractical
due to the heavy flow of traffic.
In rejecting the requirement of some level of suspicion, the Court
noted that a requirement of suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a
constitutional search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. s3
However, in Martinez-Fuerte, the checkpoint stops were held to be so
limited in scope as to be reasonable without any level of suspicion.8 4
"[O]ne's expectation of privacy in an automobile and of freedom in its
operation are significantly different from the traditional expectation of
privacy... ."85 The Court carefully limited the scope of the holding
and stated that any further detention must be based on consent or
probable cause.8 6
Martinez-Fuerte marked the first in a long line of strong dissents
from Justices Brennan and Marshall regarding the Court's "eviscera-
tion" of Fourth Amendment protections by allowing standardless
seizures.8 7 Justices Brennan and Marshall criticized the Court's use
of balancing as the test of reasonableness because it allowed an indi-
vidual's protections under the Fourth Amendment to be overwhelmed
by a governmental interest. 8S The majority saw their dissent as re-
flecting "unwarranted concern" that the decision marked a radical in-
trusion on citizens' rights and reiterated its commitment to the
standards of probable cause and reasonable suspicion under the
Fourth Amendment.8 9 Further, the majority repeated that its hold-
ing, that no individualized suspicion is needed to exercise search
power, was confined to permanent checkpoints.90
The Court's commitment, articulated in Martinez-Fuerte, to re-
quire a suspicion standard in administrative searches was followed in
Delaware v. Prouse.91 The Court held that stopping and detaining a
driver of a vehicle to check his driver's license and registration was
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment without some articulable
reasonable suspicion that the motorist was unlicensed or that the au-
82. Id. at 566-67. See also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979)(holding that
stopping and detaining drivers without reasonable suspicion is unconstitutional).
83. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976).
84. Id. at 557.
85. Id. at 561.
86. Id. at 567.
87. Id. (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
88. Id. at 570.
89. Id. at 567 n. 19.
90. Id.
91. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
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tomobile was not registered. 92 The Court held that such stops were
seizures under the Fourth Amendment.93
In 1990, the level of suspicion required under the Fourth Amend-
ment was again put to the test in Michigan Department of State Police
v. Sitz.94 In Sitz, a group of motorists brought an action to challenge
the constitutionality of a highway sobriety checkpoint program in
which all vehicles passing through a checkpoint would be stopped and
the drivers "briefly" examined for signs of intoxication. Finding un-
persuasive the argument that a balancing test was not the proper
method of analysis and that the analysis must proceed from a suspi-
cion standard of probable cause or reasonable suspicion, the Supreme
Court held that this case was indistinguishable from Martinez-Fuerte
where it had upheld the constitutionality of checkpoints for illegal
aliens without a suspicion standard.95
In upholding the balancing analysis, the Court reasoned that
where a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves a special governmental
need beyond the normal need for law enforcement, a balancing of in-
.terests at stake is the correct test of constitutionality. The Court held
that the problem of drunk drivers was so grave that a minimal intru-
sion was reasonable under a balancing test without a suspicion re-
quirement.96 Unlike Prouse, the Court noted that this case involved
neither random stops nor a complete absence of empirical data indi-
cating that the stops would be an effective means of promoting road-
way safety.97
In the Sitz dissent, Justices Brennan and Marshall reiterated their
concern about the use of balancing as a test of reasonableness. Their
concern was that the lack of a suspicion standard combined with a
balancing test allowed the Court to undervalue intrusions protected
by the Fourth Amendment so that methods for attending to the special
need at stake overwhelmed the Fourth Amendment interests.9 8 They
argued that some level of individualized suspicion is the core compo-
nent of Fourth Amendment protections.9 9 In addition, they reasoned
that this case was not like Martinez-Fuerte. In Martinez-Fuerte, they
noted that suspicionless stops were justified because the flow of traffic
was too heavy to allow a particularized study of a given car to identify
those that were possible carriers of illegal aliens.100 Brennan and
Marshall pointed out that in Sitz there had been no showing of a simi-
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
95. Id. at 451-52.
96. Id. at 449-50.
97. Id. at 454.
98. Id. at 455-56 (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
99. Id. at 456.
100. Id. at 458.
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lar difficulty in detecting individuals who were driving under the in-
fluence of alcohol.101 Moreover, they stated that stopping every car to
prevent drunken driving had never been a sufficient justification for
abandoning a constitutional requirement.
The needs of law enforcement stand in constant tension with the constitu-
tion's protections of the individual against certain exercises of official power.
It is precisely the predictability of these pressures that counsels a resolute
loyalty to constitutional safeguards.
[C]onsensus that a particular law enforcement technique serves a laudable
purpose has never been the touchstone of constitutional analysis.
The Fourth Amendment was designed not merely to protect against official
intrusions whose social utility was less as measured by some "balancing test"
than its intrusion on individual privacy; it was designed in addition to grant
the individual a zone of privacy whose protections could be breached only
where the "reasonable" requirements of the probable-cause standard were
met .... 102
By 1989, the exercise of search power without suspicion was solidly
entrenched in the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, despite
the Court's assurances in Martinez-Fuerte. In two separate holdings,
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executive AssociationlO3 and National
Treasury Employees v. Von Raab,104 the Court again reasoned that
the exercise of search power may be reasonable without any suspicion,
if the privacy interests of the individual were minimal and were out-
weighed by the governmental interest at stake. In those cases, the
Court held that suspicionless testing of government employees was
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because a compelling gov-
ernmental interest outweighed privacy concerns.105
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executive Association,106 railway la-
bor organizations filed suit to enjoin drug testing regulations affecting
railroad employees. Finding that alcohol and drug abuse by railroad
employees posed a serious threat to safety, the Federal Railroad Ad-
ministration (FRA) had promulgated regulations that mandated blood
and urine tests of employees who were involved in certain train acci-
dents. The FRA had also adopted regulations that authorized rail-
roads to administer breath and urine tests to employees who violated
certain safety rules. The question presented to the Court was whether
101. Id.
102. Id. at 458-59 (quoting Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273
(1973) and Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)(Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
103. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
104. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
105. Id.; Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989). Today, over
20% of the nation's workforce is subjected to suspicionless drug testing. GiLIoM,
supra note 3, at 5. A mix of private and public employers is involved. The Fourth
Amendment, of course, does not apply to private employers, only to those working
under the color of the government.
106. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
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the government's need to monitor compliance with restrictions on
drug and alcohol use via these regulations violated the Fourth Amend-
ment's protection of privacy intrusions absent any individualized sus-
picion. The Court reiterated that obtaining and examining evidence is
a search under the Fourth Amendment if doing so infringed upon an
expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.O7 The
Court also noted that the ensuing chemical analysis of the sample to
obtain physiological data is a further invasion of the tested employee's
privacy interests.
[C]hemical analysis of urine, like that of blood, can reveal a host of private
medical facts about an employee, including whether he or she is epileptic,
pregnant, or diabetic. Nor can it be disputed that the process of collecting the
sample to be tested, which may in some cases involve visual or aural monitor-
ing of the act of urination, itself implicates privacy interests....
There are few activities in our society more personal or private than the
passing of urine. Most people describe it by euphemisms if they talk about it
at all. It is a function traditionally performed without public observation; in-
deed, its performance in public is generally prohibited by law as well as social
custom.1 0 8
However, Skinner pointed out that the Fourth Amendment does not
proscribe all searches and seizures that may impact privacy interests,
only those that are unreasonable.30 9
In determining what is reasonable, the Court again evoked the lan-
guage of Sitz. What is reasonable, the Court said, depends upon the
circumstances surrounding the search or seizure.11o When those in-
terests at stake represent special needs beyond the normal need for
law enforcement, the correct test of reasonableness balances the na-
ture of the search or seizure itself as it pertains to the intrusion on the
individual against the interests at stake.131 The Court pointed out
that it had previously recognized the government's interest in dispens-
ing with a warrant or suspicion requirement if those requirements
were likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the
search.112 In balancing the intrusions on privacy for employees, the
Court concluded that railroad employees had a diminished expecta-
tion of privacy in a industry pervasively regulated to ensure safety.
In their dissent, Justices Brennan and Marshall again refused to
agree with the reasoning behind the majority's upholding of suspi-
cionless testing. They stated that permitting the government to force
entire railroad crews to submit to invasive tests, without evidence of
drug or alcohol use, was shortsighted and allowed basic constitutional
107. Id. at 617.
108. Id. (quoting National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175
(5th Cir. 1987)).
109. Id. at 619.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 619-20.
112. Id. at 623.
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rights to fall prey to momentary emergencies.1 13 Further, the dissent
claimed that in reaching its result the majority ignored the text and
doctrinal history of the Fourth Amendment, which requires that
highly intrusive searches be based on probable cause and not cost-ben-
efit calculations of agencies or judges. "The few searches which we
upheld in the absence of individualized justification were routinized,
fleeting, and nonintrusive encounters conducted pursuant to regula-
tory programs which entailed no contact with the person."114 Accord-
ing to the dissent, since the Court first began recognizing special
needs exceptions to the Fourth Amendment, Fourth Amendment doc-
trine has been badly distorted and has jettisoned the only standard
that finds support in the text of the Fourth Amendment, thereby dan-
gerously weakening the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to protect
the privacy and security of citizens. 115
In widening the "special needs" exception to probable cause to authorize
searches of the human body unsupported by any evidence of wrongdoing, the
majority today completes the process... of eliminating altogether the prob-
able-cause requirement for civil searches-those undertaken for reasons "be-
yond the normal need for law enforcement".... [Ulpon the mere assertion of a
"special need" even the deepest dignitary and privacy interest become vulner-
able to governmental incursion.... [Hiowever, the Fourth Amendment...
does not confine its protections to either criminal or civil actions. Instead, it
protects generally "the right of the people to be secure." 116
The dissent found that the majority's characterization of the railroad
workers' privacy interests as minimal underscored the easy manipula-
bility of the balancing approach to Fourth Amendment standards. .17
Undeterred by the stinging dissent in Skinner, the Court upheld a
similar drug testing program in National Treasury Employees Union
v. Von Raab.1s In Von Raab, the Court held that suspicionless test-
ing of employees applying for promotions to positions involving in-
terdiction of illegal drugs or requiring them to carry firearms was
reasonable and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court
reasoned that the government's need to conduct suspicionless
searches of employees engaged directly in drug interdiction and those
who were otherwise required to carry firearms outweighed the privacy
interests of those employees.119 Von Raab differed from Skinner in
that there was no evidence of drug use among the group subjected to
the testing. In Skinner, the drug testing regulations targeted a class
with a demonstrated frequency of drug and alcohol use. There was no
such demonstration in Von Raab of drug or alcohol use. Justices
113. Id. at 635 (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
114. Id. at 637-38.
115. Id. at 639.
116. Id. at 640-41.
117. Id. at 647.
118. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
119. Id. at 677.
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Scalia and Stevens, who had sided with the majority in Skinner, dis-
sented. They asserted that based on the lack of evidence regarding
drug use by the targeted group, the Customs Service drug testing pol-
icy was an "immolation of privacy and human dignity in symbolic op-
position to drug use."120
The special needs doctrine was first extended into the public school
context in New Jersey v. T.L. 0.121 In T.L. 0., the Court concluded that
students have a legitimate expectation of privacy;1 22 therefore,
searches of students by school officials fall within the protection of the
Fourth Amendment. 123 Additionally, the Court held that reasonable
suspicion was the appropriate standard to determine the reasonable-
ness of searches in the school setting.124
In T.L.O., a teacher found a 14-year-old freshman smoking in the
bathroom in violation of a school rule. The student was taken to the
assistant vice principal. When the student denied that she had been
smoking, the assistant vice principal demanded to see the student's
purse. Upon opening her purse, he found a pack of cigarettes and roll-
ing papers commonly associated with the use of marihuana. The prin-
cipal then proceeded to search the purse thoroughly and found some
marihuana, a pipe, plastic bags, a fairly substantial amount of money,
an index card containing a list of students who owed her money, and
two letters implicating her in marihuana dealing. The evidence was
turned over to the police. Thereafter, the state brought delinquency
charges against her in juvenile court. The court held that the Fourth
Amendment applied to the school search; and under the Fourth
Amendment, the search was reasonable.125
120. Id. at 681.
121. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
122. Id. at 333-34. "We have recognized that even a limited search of the person is a
substantial invasion of privacy.... A search of a child's person or of a closed
purse or other bag carried on her person, no less than a similar search carried out
on an adult, is undoubtedly a severe violation of subjective expectations of pri-
vacy." Id. at 337-38 (citations omitted).
123. Id. at 333-36. "In carrying out searches and other disciplinary functions pursu-
ant to such policies, school officials act as representatives of the State, not merely
as surrogates for the parents, and they cannot claim the parents' immunity from
the strictures of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 336-37.
124. Id. at 341.
125. State ex rel. T.L.O., 428 A.2d 1327, 1334 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1980). On appeal
from the final judgment of the juvenile court, a divided appellate division af-
firmed the trial court's finding that there had been no Fourth Amendment viola-
tion, but vacated the adjudication of delinquency and remanded for a
determination of whether T.L.O. had knowingly and voluntarily waived her Fifth
Amendment rights before confessing. State ex rel. T.L.O., 448 A.2d 493, 493 (N.J.
Super, Ct. App. Div. 1982). T.L.O. appealed the Fourth Amendment ruling, and
the Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the judgment of the appellate division
and ordered the suppression of the evidence found in T.L.O.'s purse. State ex rel.
T.L.O., 463 A.2d 934, 944 (N.J. 1983). With respect to the question of the legality
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Subsequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the juvenile court hold-
ing.126 The court stated that if the vice principal had a reasonable
suspicion that the student had cigarettes in her purse, the search was
justified.127 Because the search in this instance was based on individ-
ualized suspicion, the Court declined at that time to decide whether
individualized suspicion is an essential element of the reasonableness
standard for school searches. Instead, the Court again noted that
some quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to
a constitutional search; however, the Court also noted that the Fourth
Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of suspicion.12s "Ex-
ceptions to the requirement of individualized suspicion are generally
appropriate only where privacy interests... are minimal."12 9
In his dissent, Justice Stevens expressed concern that the Court's
holding in T.L.O. would allow school administrators to search stu-
dents suspected of violating even the most trivial school regulations or
guidelines for behavior.130 In response, the majority suggested it
would be inappropriate for a judge to evaluate the relative importance
of various school rules.
We have "repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive
authority of the States13 1 and of school officials, consistent with fundamental
of the search before it, the court agreed with the juvenile court that a warrantless
search by a school official does not violate the Fourth Amendment so long as the
official "has reasonable grounds to believe that a student possesses evidence of
illegal activity or activity that would interfere with school discipline and order."
Id. at 941-42. However, the court, with two justices dissenting, sharply disagreed
with the juvenile court's conclusion that the search of the purse was reasonable.
According to the majority, the contents of T.L.O.'s purse had no bearing on the
accusation against T.L.O. for possession of cigarettes (as opposed to smoking
them in the lavatory), T.L.O. did not violate school rules, and a mere desire for
evidence that would impeach T.L.O.'s claim that she did not smoke cigarettes
could not justify the search. Moreover, even ifa reasonable suspicion that T.L.O.
had cigarettes in her purse would justify a search, the vice principal had no such
suspicion as no one had furnished him with any specific information that there
were cigarettes in the purse. Finally, leaving aside the question whether the vice
principal was justified in opening the purse, the court held that the evidence of
drug use that he saw inside did not justify the extensive "rummaging" through
T.L.O's papers and effects that followed. Id. at 942-43. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 464 U.S. 991 (1983).
126. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 344-47 (1985)(holding that under the circum-
stances the search of the student's purse was reasonable).
127. Id. at 345. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the vice principal had no
reasonable suspicion that cigarettes were in the purse. State ex rel. T.L.O., 463
A.2d 934, 944 (N.J. 1983). The Supreme Court held that the requirement of rea-
sonable suspicion is not a requirement of absolute certainty but sufficient
probability. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 346 (1985).
128. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 371 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
131. In some ways, this deference to the states is the only way the Vernonia decision
can be reconciled with Fourth Amendment protections. The State of Nebraska
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constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the school...."
Absent any suggestion that the rule violates some substantive constitutional
guarantee, the courts should, . . . defer to that judgment and refrain from
attempting to distinguish between rules that are important to the preserva-
tion of order in the schools and rules that are not. 132
"By focusing attention on the question of reasonableness, the standard
will spare teachers and school administrators the necessity of school-
ing themselves in the niceties of probable cause ... ."133
In Vernonia, the Court again reiterated that special needs make
the probable cause requirement impractical.134 Strict adherence to
the probable cause standard, the Court noted, would impede the
school's ability to maintain order.135 Vernonia had changed the rea-
sonable suspicion standard in T.L.O. to a requirement of no suspicion.
The Court justified this transition by citing other special needs cases
where the Court had upheld the constitutionality of searches exer-
cised without suspicion. 136 Ultimately, the Court reasoned that the
standard in school searches under the Fourth Amendment was
whether the search is one that a reasonable guardian and tutor might
can, of course, insist on a more demanding standard under its own statutes or
Art. 1 § 7 of the Nebraska Constitution. Art. 1 § 7 of the Nebraska Constitution
has adopted the same language as the Fourth Amendment. In light of the signifi-
cant erosion of Fourth Amendment protections signaled by the Supreme Court's
recent Fourth Amendment decisions, I would argue that the Nebraska Supreme
Court should grant broader protection under the Nebraska Constitution. How-
ever, the Nebraska Supreme Court has not displayed a tendency to deviate from
Supreme Court constructions. See, e.g., State v. Trahan, 229 Neb. 683, 428
N.W.2d 619 (1988); State v. Colgrove, 198 Neb. 319, 253 N.W.2d 20 (1988).
For cases in which states have departed from the Supreme Court's construc-
tion of constitutional protections under the First Amendment where the state
wanted to grant greater protection see Attorney General v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d
233 (Mass. 1994), and State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990).
132. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1995)(citation omitted). Compare this
statement to the Court's analysis in Vernonia where it seems to engage in just
such an analysis. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2394-96
(1995).
133. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 343 (1985). Consider the absurdity of the
Supreme Court's position. The Court is willing to weaken constitutionally pro-
tected liberties to avoid imposing cumbersome or complex rules on educational
bureaucrats. Yet, Americans are forced to deal with a plethora of complex laws
everyday. Consider tax laws, for example. Wouldn't a similar argument in this
context seem absurd. "I'm sorry Mr. IRS agent. I know the tax law requires...
but the Supreme Court recently recognized that the law may just be too cumber-
some or complex for some of us. Therefore, we should be entitled to modify the
tax code to make compliance easier in our situation."
134. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2391 (1995).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 2391 (citing Michigan Dep't. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990);
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); National Treas-
ury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); United States v. Marti-
nez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976)).
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undertake, regardless of suspicion.13 7 Based on the findings of need
made by the district court, the Supreme Court concluded that in
Vernonia suspicionless searches were justified.
With the holding in Vernonia, the disappearance of the suspicion
requirement in administrative searches is complete. Suspicionless
searches have been adopted, extended, followed, and firmly en-
trenched in legal precedent. One can no longer have any sense of
what the Fourth Amendment will protect in the context of "social
problems." First, in Martinez-Fuerte, the Court purported to limit no
suspicion searches to brief, minimally intrusive checkpoint stops of
persons in automobiles. Later, in Skinner and Von Raab, the Court
purported to limit its holding to safety-sensitive jobs. However, the
law once bent does not easily bend back.138 Consequently, a new gen-
eration of Americans are faced with the specter of widely expanded
search power. The Court's characterization of the privacy interests
implicated by urine collection as minimal is shocking. Something is
terribly wrong here.
B. The Legacy of Vernonia
One of the legacies of the Court's decision in Vernonia is that
school districts across the country will consider implementing suspi-
cionless drug testing of students.139 As Justice O'Connor noted in the
Vernonia dissent:
The population of our Nation's public schools, grades 7 through 12, num-
bers around 18 million. By the reasoning of today's decision, the millions of
these students who participate in interscholastic sports, an overwhelming ma-
jority of whom have given school officials no reason whatsoever to suspect they
use drugs at school, are open to an intrusive bodily search.1 4 0
One report estimates that 29,742,000 children were enrolled in public
school grades kindergarten through eight and approximately
11,284,000 in grades nine through twelve.141 More than 16 percent of
the population is in a public elementary or secondary school set-
ting.142 While the majority in Vernonia was careful to indicate that
their holding does not mean that all suspicionless testing will be con-
stitutional,143 previous extensions of the special needs doctrine sug-
137. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2397 (1995).
138. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 655 (Marshall & Bren-
nan, JJ., dissenting) (quoting Holmes, J.).
139. See, e.g., Dunbar & Kaipust, supra note 4.
140. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2397 (1995)(O'Connor, J., dis-
senting)(citations omitted).
141. Van Dorn, supra note 70, at 479.
142. Id.
143. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2396 (1995) ("We caution
against the assumption that suspicionless drug testing will readily pass constitu-
tional muster in other contexts.").
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gest that there will be some pressing social policy reason that can
justify subjecting all these children to suspicionless testing in the
future.144
Additionally, the Court's limiting language spoke to the extension
of suspicionless testing to contexts outside of the public school system
and did not make any references to limits on suspicionless testing in
public schools. In cautioning against the constitutionality of suspi-
cionless testing in other contexts, the Court stated that "[t]he most
significant element in this case is the first we discussed: that the Pol-
icy was undertaken in furtherance of the government's responsibili-
ties, under a public school system, as guardian and tutor of children
entrusted to its care."145
In T.L.O., the Court articulated a two-prong test for when school
searches are reasonable.146 First, whether the action was justified at
its inception and second, whether the search was reasonably related
in scope to the circumstances which justified the intrusion in the first
place.147 This two-prong test was not expressly applied in Vernonia.
In Vernonia, the Court eliminated the requirement of reasonable sus-
picion that it articulated in T.L.O. However, the Court's reasoning
displays a kind of indirect application of the same analysis. Therefore,
the first prong of the T.L. 0. inquiry, whether the search was justified
at its inception, may still provide a useful context for determining
when suspicionless testing policies directed at student athletes will be
constitutional.
1. Justified at Its Inception
In Vernonia, the Court's justifications for the reasonableness of
suspicionless testing was supported by the testimony of teachers and
administrators that there had been a sharp increase in drug use in the
District and that students had begun to speak out about their attrac-
tion to the drug culture and to boast that there was nothing the school
could do about it.148 According to school officials, drugs had doubled
the number of disciplinary problems.14 9 Athletes were identified as
the leaders of the drug culture. Further, because athletics played an
important role in the community, student athletes were admired. The
District initially responded to the perceived drug problem with drug
144. When all of the public school children are added to the percentage of the nation's
workforce that is also subjected to random testing, roughly one-third of the na-
tion's population is affected. See also GiLmOM, supra note 3, at 5.
145. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2396 (1995). However, the
Court has already sanctioned suspicionless testing in other contexts. National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
146. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985).
147. Id.
148. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2388 (1995).
149. Id.
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education, but the problems persisted. According to the district
court's findings, the administration was at its wit's end.15o Large por-
tions of the student body, particularly those in athletics, were in a
state of rebellion.151
In contrast, when it was reported that the Millard School District
was considering the implementation of a drug testing policy for stu-
dent athletes, the need was attributed to the possible use of steroids
by student athletes.152 A Millard School Board member, who was a
team physician at Millard North High School, advocated implement-
ing a drug-testing policy for athletes. He claimed he had seen telltale
signs of anabolic steroid use among athletes at Millard North, Millard
South, and other Omaha-area high schools.153 These signs included
stretch marks on the chest, arms, and back; mood swings; and unu-
sual weight gain.1 54 "These guys leave for the summer weighing 150
pounds and come back at 225 pounds," the physician said. 155 "Nobody
can gain that kind of weight unless they're doing steroids."156 Based
on his examinations of Millard North players and observations of
other teams at sporting events, the physician said he would "guessti-
mate" that there were one or two athletes in every school throughout
the metropolitan area using steroids.157
It is not clear from the holding in Vernonia whether suspicionless
testing of all student athletes within a school could be justified on the
basis of one or two students using steroids. On one hand, the Court
has put great reliance on the evidence of drug use among the students
at Vernonia and the resultant disciplinary problems. Thus, immedi-
acy was a significant factor in weighing the interest at stake. The in-
terest at stake, the Court said, must appear important enough to
justify the search in light of other factors which show the search to be
relatively intrusive.158 On the other hand, the Court has also refused
to require any evidence of actual drug use when justifying suspi-
cionless drug testing in other cases.1 59
In Vernonia, the Court seemed to rely on evidence suggesting that
drug use was a threat to the educational process in the District.160
This threat appeared in large part to be the justification for the testing
150. Id. at 2389.
151. Id.






158. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2394-95 (1995).
159. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
160. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2395 (1995)("[A] large segment
of the student body.., was in a state of rebellion....").
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policy.161 At the same time, deterrence was also a factor in the weigh-
ing of the governmental interest.162 Consequently, it is unclear after
Vernonia whether there must be evidence of drug use to support drug
testing as a deterrence factor or how much evidence is needed to jus-
tify testing.1 6 3
Comparing the facts of Vernonia to the circumstances present in
the Millard School District suggests that any Millard drug testing pol-
icy based on the above information does not raise the governmental
interest to the level that justified suspicionless testing in Vernonia. It
is unlikely that the Millard School District could show the kind of in-
terference with the educational process that was demonstrated in
Vernonia. The question may turn on whether testing can be justified
as a largely symbolic device on the war against drugs.164 Subjecting
hundreds of athletes in one school to suspicionless testing to uncover
one or two instances of drug use would be largely a symbolic
deterrent. 165
Based on the articulable suspicion of the Millard School Board
member pushing for the testing, a search based on individualized sus-
picion would be constitutional. However, the Millard School District
should have a rule prohibiting the use of steroids, should be able to
articulate an interest that the school would have in uncovering the
use of steroids, and should be able to articulate why it is likely that
testing of certain individuals will turn up evidence of steroid use.16 6
Steroid use is a much different application of drug testing. In light
of the relative unobtrusiveness of this type of drug abuse, justifica-
tions would necessarily center around protection of the individual at
risk as opposed to protection for students at large and the integrity of
the educational environment. Steroids are the kind of drug likely to
be used by only a limited class of individuals; thus, the deterrence fac-
tor would be relatively limited.
In addition, some of the reasons for implementing drug testing that
were articulated by the Millard School Board member advocating the
testing present a problem. "We have to develop sanctions. There has
161. "[This] is an immediate crisis of greater proportions than existed in Skinner...."
Id.
162. Id.
163. Much of the criticism of the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence results
because the Court has riddled the Fourth Amendment with exceptions on a case
by case basis that makes it difficult to develop any workable Fourth Amendment
doctrine. See Sundby, supra note 30; Sundby, supra note 44.
164. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 680-81
(1989)(Scalia, J., dissenting)(searches are reasonable only when a social necessity
prompts the search).
165. Id.
166. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
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to be a hammer."167 These types of interests may cut too close to the
kind of arbitrary punitive sanctions that make the Court uneasy
about the role of suspicionless drug testing in the public schools.168
Punitive sanctions take the Court too far afield from much of the spe-
cial needs analysis in civil cases that justified the exception to Fourth
Amendment requirements in the first place. Punitive purposes are too
closely related to the criminal context where Fourth Amendment stan-
dards are higher.
Perhaps the dissent in Vernonia shed the greatest light on how to
approach the limits of the holding in Vernonia.
It cannot be too often stated that the greatest threats to our constitutional
freedoms come in times of crises. But we must also stay mindful that not all
government responses to such times are hysterical overreactions. Some crises
are quite real; and when they are, they serve precisely as the compelling state
interest that we have said may justify a measured intrusion on constitutional
rights. The only way for judges to mediate these conflicting impulses is to do
what they should do anyway: stay close to the record in each case that ap-
pears before them and make their judgments based on that alone. Having
reviewed the record here, I cannot avoid the conclusion that the District's sus-
picionless policy of testing all student-athletes sweeps too broadly, and too
imprecisely, to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 169
The majority did not agree with the dissent that the policy swept too
broadly and imprecisely. However, the dissent's statement is still in-
structive as to what may be required by school districts, following in
the wake of Vernonia, who are attempting to implement drug testing
policies.
2. From Power to Powerless
The Supreme Court's recharacterization of Fourth Amendment
rights in special needs situations has dramatically altered the equilib-
rium established by the Constitution for those individuals who fall
within the boundaries of a special needs exception. These individuals
are, therefore, powerless to forego the intrusion on their liberties with-
out relinquishment of some right.170 Prior to the development of spe-
cial needs exceptions, it was generally accepted that the exercise of
search power over an individual required some trigger before the in-
trusion could be justified. Fourth Amendment protection in the civil
167. Dunbar & Kaipust, supra note 4.
168. The Court in T.L.O declined to address the role of law enforcement officials in
school searches. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 n.7 (1985). Also,
searches that may be perceived as too punitive are less likely to receive support
from parents. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2396 (1995).
169. Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2407 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
170. While school sports have been characterized as a privilege, the distinction be-
tween rights and privileges have been largely extinguished under constitutional
protections. See Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 567
(1972).
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context no longer requires a discernable event in order to relinquish
one's right to be free from arbitrary intrusion.
The idea of the Constitution is that individual citizens are en-
trusted with certain powers and privileges. "[T]he Constitution can be
understood as part of a broader movement that transformed govern-
ment rule from an aristocratic endeavor to one based upon a recogni-
tion of the citizenry as its source of power."171 Without the
requirement of some discernable event that triggers the relinquish-
ment of Fourth Amendment protections, those in positions of power
are now in the position of aristocrats who exercise power at will over a
less dominant class.172
Forcing junior and senior high students to choose between submit-
ting to intrusive, suspicionless drug testing without a trigger or to for-
feit the privilege of participating in school sports and suffer the loss of
self-actualization, achievement, and belonging that are a part of that
experience is a form of coercion. 173 Likewise, workers faced with sus-
picionless drug testing are forced to choose between compliance and
lost income and benefits. As American citizens, individuals are enti-
tled to certain privileges and protections. To compromise the rights
and privileges of another without articulable reasons that relate re-
sponsively to those individuals signals a significant shift in the area of
personal freedoms.
Many of the consequences of the Court's holding in Vernonia are
not readily apparent and beyond the expertise of jurisprudence. For
instance, what will the drug testing of children do to their develop-
ment of healthy boundaries? In addition, while Vernonia seems to
suggest that the drug testing policy implemented in that school dis-
trict was largely effective, those results may be misleading. When the
heat is on, students may change their outward behavior but that does
not mean that the policy itself has been effective in deterring drug use.
Drug use is only a symptom of a much larger problem. Suspicionless
drug testing policies do not force parents, administrators, or judges to
deal with the underlying issues. Those policies will be successful only
in displacing or repressing the underlying problems. And, what if you
171. Sundby, supra note 30, at 1782.
172. See also Sundby, supra note 44 (proposing model of Fourth Amendment based on
whether intrusion is initiatory or responsive).
173. A recent decision by an Arizona district court, prior to the decision in Vernonia,
recognized that forcing students to consent to drug testing or to forfeit the right
to play school sports was a form of coercion that did not signal voluntary consent.
Moule v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist. N69, 863 F. Supp. 1098, 1103 (D.
Ariz. 1994). Unfortunately, the court of appeals held, in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in Vernonia, that the youngsters' constitutional rights were not
violated by being required to submit to a suspicionless drug test in order to play
sports. Moule v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist. N69, rev'd without opinion, 66
F.3d 335 (9th Cir. 1995).
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ask a student to choose between sports and drugs and he chooses
drugs?174
Students are now required to prove their innocence. That was rea-
son enough for young James Acton to resent the drug test. James'
parents said that they believed their son, who said he was not using
drugs, and they did not think he should have to prove it.175
IV. CONCLUSION
"The greatest threats to our constitutional freedoms come in times
of crisis."176 When the Constitutional Convention ended, Benjamin
Franklin was asked, "[W]hat have you wrought?" He answered, '[A]
Republic, if you can keep it."17 7 Recent history indicates that the chal-
lenge will get harder as the technology gets better.178 We cannot
know how much courage it took for the founders of our nation to sup-
port the ideals which laid the foundation for this republic. However, it
is clear that in light of contemporary social problems, it will take cour-
age for us to keep them.
In the final analysis, the Court's holding in Vernonia generates two
areas of inquiry: 1) the role of Fourth Amendment freedoms and con-
stitutional principles in general and 2) concern regarding the applica-
tion of the special needs doctrine to suspicionless drug testing policies
in public schools.
At issue is whether pervasive social problems should be allowed to
circumvent or suspend basic constitutional freedoms. Inherent in this
question is a balancing of the broad choices involved.179 The choice is
whether to allow infringements on constitutional freedoms to control
174. See Shatel, supra note 69.
175. Court OKs Drug Tests For Athletes Students Have Less Privacy, Ruling Says,
OiAHA WORLD HERALD, June 27, 1995, at 1.
176. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2407 (1995)(O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
177. THE CO MSSION ON THE BICENTENNIAL, THE CONSTrruTION OF TnE UNrrED
STATES 47 (15th ed. 1991).
178. See generally Theresa E. Morelli, Genetic Discrimination by Insurers: Legal Pro-
tections Needed from Abuse ofBiotechnology, 8 Health Span 8 (Sept. 1992); Brad-
ley J. Plaschke, United States v. Dealer: Thermal Imagery The Latest Assault on
the Fourth Amendment Right to Privacy, 12 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L.
607 (1994); Philip R. Reilly, Public Policy and Legal Issues raised by Advances in
Genetic Screening and Testing, 27 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 1327 (1993).
179. As we contemplate the implications of this choice, it is interesting to note the fate
of James Acton, the Oregon seventh grader whose lawsuit against the Vernonia
School District went all the way to the Supreme Court. Shatel, supra note 69.
James Acton was barred from playing junior high football because he refused to
take a drug test. He said that because he was one of the smartest kids in his
class and had never been in trouble, he felt as though that "was proof enough that
[he] wasn't taking drugs." Id. Judy Acton, his mother, told the Associated Press
last summer that James was going to computer camp during the summer. Id.
She said her son will probably not play school sports. Id.
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pressing social problems or to reject as a solution to social problems
any action that infringes on constitutional protections. The Court's
development of the special needs exception seems to be an acknowl-
edgement that these are indeed the choices. The rhetoric in the
Court's Fourth Amendment holdings under the special needs doctrine
seems to suggest that the Court does not believe the Fourth Amend-
ment provides the protections that are at stake in special need cases.
On the contrary, the Court suggests that these special needs, beyond
the normal need for law enforcement, justify a less traditional applica-
tion of Fourth Amendment protections.
The special needs doctrine which allows Fourth Amendment free-
doms to be circumvented is now firmly entrenched in our judicial sys-
tem. The only way the special needs doctrine can avoid completely
eroding constitutional freedoms is to ensure that suspicionless drug
testing is, at the least, justified at its inception; that the suspicion evi-
dence weigh heavily against the group in question; and that the
number of group members implicated justify the intrusion. Deter-
rence alone should not be sufficient to trigger random, suspicionless
testing. Rather, in the public school setting, the integrity of the edu-
cational process must play a role in the justification for a special needs
exception.
Sherri L. Toussaint '97
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